A Mid-Course View THE IMPLEMENTATION of the economic policies labeled "gradualism" may be said to date from the enactment of the income tax surcharge in June 1968. But the original expectations, in retrospect called "hopes," that the gradualist policies would have "worked" by the summer of 1970 have not been fulfilled. It now appears that the real test of the gradualist policies will be economic performance over the next several years. Unfortunately, therefore, a mid-course rather than a retrospective view is all that can now be attempted. This examination of gradualism will be limited to the aggregate output and price level goals of policy; balance-of-payments and other goals are completely neglected. The first section will be devoted to a general discussion of the issues, with special emphasis on the distinction between goalgradualism and instrument-gradualism. Goal-gradualism refers to policies designed, in the present context, to achieve a gradual reduction in inflation and thereby to avoid the high level of unemployment that a rapid reduction of inflation would require. Instrument-gradualism refers to policies involving gradual adjustment of the instruments of fiscal and monetary policy, that is, of government expenditures and tax rates, and of the money stock and other financial variables. 
In the second section the topic is the nature of the monetary policies consistent with a goal-gradualist result. The analysis is based on simulations of the FRB-MIT-Penn econometric model of the United States, hereafter referred to simply as "the model."' In order to concentrate on the broad, long-range problems of adjusting to a lower rate of inflation without creating excessive unemployment, the simulations are run for a seven-year period, from the first quarter of 1969 through the fourth quarter of 1975. Simulation over this period requires that numerous assumptions be made about the behavior of the exogenous variables. The assumptions used are considered reasonable for the purposes of the broad view intended, but no effort has been spent on the details of time paths of exogenous variables or on making the minor adjustments in constant terms in equations, and so on, that are necessary when the model is used for short-run forecasts.
While the primary purpose of the section is to provide a broad view of the problems of achieving gradual adjustment, the first part briefly reviews the 1969:1-1970:2 period. Simulation of the model over this period using the actual values of the exogenous variables suggests that aggregate demand has been stronger than would have been expected from past experience as incorporated in the model.
An examination of instrument-gradualism appears in the next section. While the concept of goal-gradualism is clearly more fundamental, instrument-gradualism nevertheless raises important issues. No one would be opposed to abrupt alterations in the settings of the policy instruments if it were certain that they would achieve the desired gradual adjustments in the goal variables. But the whole case for instrument-gradualism is based on uncertainty, and it is a case that cannot be ignored.
It should be emphasized that all of the analysis based on the model is speculative, in the sense that it is not known how faithfully the model represents the economy. Nevertheless, there will be relatively little discussion of the model per se, but rather the simulations will be used to suggest policy approaches. To proceed otherwise would make this paper an examination of the model rather than of the policy of gradualism.
The Meanings of Gradualism
The policy of gradualism represents a new advance in public understanding of economic stabilization policy. Unlike their approach to previous anti-inflation crusades in the postwar period, politicians and the informed public now clearly recognize that excessive zeal in fighting inflation will produce excessive unemployment. This public concern about how economic policy instruments ought to be adjusted is the logical sequel to public acceptance that policy instruments exist and ought to be used.
The prescription of gradualism involves the maintenance of firm but mild restraint until the objectives of anti-inflationary policy are realized. Real output is to be maintained somewhat below potential until the rate of inflation declines to an acceptable level. But no one knows what adjustments of the policy instruments are required to achieve this gradualism in the paths of the goal variables. And some have confused goal-gradualism with instrument-gradualism. "Firm but mild restraint" strongly suggests gradual and moderate changes in the settings of the instruments of policy, but such changes may not lead to the desired reduction of inflation while simultaneously avoiding excessive unemployment.
It may, of course, be true that goal-gradualism requires instrumentgradualism. This view is reinforced by the diagnosis of the current inflation. The problem was not that economic policy failed to offset some series of disturbances in the private economy; rather, fiscal policy became excessively expansionary because expenditures for the Vietnam war were not offset by tax increases or reductions in other expenditures; and monetary policy, as measured by the rate of growth of the money stock, became excessively expansionary in an attempt to prevent interest rates from rising too sharply. A tax increase in 1966 to cover the war expenditures and a moderate, steady rate of growth in the money stock in the 1965-68 period would have helped immensely. If government economic policies, as measured by the full employment surplus and the rate of growth of the money stock, had been steady, or had changed relatively little and then only gradually rather than abruptly, the economic picture would have been much brighter in January 1969.
But even if it is agreed that large and abrupt changes in the settings of policy instruments contributed to the inflationary problem, it is by no means clear that gradually restoring the instruments to "normal" settings is required to rectify the situation. Given the state of the economy in January 1969, abrupt changes in the policy instruments might have been required to produce gradual adjustment of the goal variables. In fact, I will argue that the shifts in the settings of the policy instruments between 1968 and 1969 must be viewed as the most deflationary change in policy since 1947. I will also argue that this sharp deflationary change was broadly justified by the conditions facing policy makers in January 1969. But the abrupt change in policy was justified only because the initial conditions were so unsatisfactory. The distinction between goal-gradualism and instrumentgradualism is, therefore, essential if improper inferences about the general appropriateness of abrupt changes in policy instruments are to be avoided.
Although the distinction between goal-and instrument-gradualism is obvious enough to most professional economists, the confounding of the two concepts in public debate is readily apparent. Since the two concepts of gradualism were not sharply distinguished in the hearings, it is not surprising that they are confused in the report of the Joint Economic Committee. While the majority views never adequately distinguishes the two concepts, the confounding is most obvious in the minority views. In this section nearly adjacent sentences on the same page read as follows: "Inflation can and must be reduced in a manner consistent with high employment." "Fiscal policy restraint, firm but gradual, is essential." [emphasis in original] "Monetary restraint should be applied gradually until there are visible signs that inflation is slowing, and must avoid another 'credit crunch.' "6
The simulations in the following sections demonstrate the great importance of distinguishing goal-gradualism from instrument-gradualism. They reveal that instrument-gradualism produces abrupt changes in the goal variables, while gradual adjustment of goal variables requires abrupt changes in monetary policy. As is emphasized below, these results stem primarily from the abnormal conditions at the beginning of the simulation period, and thus cannot be interpreted as providing evidence for the desirability of abrupt policy changes under normal circumstances. First, however, it is interesting to examine a simulation that attempts to determine whether the economy remained stronger from 1969:1 through 1970:2 than would have been expected from past experience as incorporated in the model. This simulation, called simulation A to distinguish it from those examined later, uses the actual historical values of all of the exogenous variables with one exception. The exception is the tax surcharge, which is assumed to expire January 1, 1970, instead of June 30, 1970, on the grounds that the model was estimated under the assumption that taxpayers considered all tax rates to be permanent, while the surcharge was known to be temporary. A special import adjustment was also necessary, since imports, being endogenous in the model, are not affected in the simulation by the dock strike that substantially affects exports (an exogenous variable) in 1969: 1. This adjustment arbitrarily reduced the annual rate of imports by $5 billion in that quarter.
Goal-Gradualism
The import and tax adjustments produce, if anything, an upward bias to simulation A. Even so, it is clear from Table 1 A possible explanation for this longer lag is that the extensive discussion of gradualism reduced fears of recession and thereby reduced the speed of adjustment. Another explanation, however, is that the current situation is outside the realm of previous experience. Except for those in which wartime controls were in effect, no period in twentieth century U.S. history exhibits both unemployment almost continuously below 4 percent and persistent inflation, as the interval from mid-1965 through 1968 does. The closest parallel is probably with 1955-57, but at that time unemployment was Given the inflationary situation in early 1969, it seems likely that investment remained stronger than anticipated in the face of restrictive monetary and fiscal policies as a result of the strength of inflationary expectations and the extent of investment backlogs. For example, in the third and fourth quarters of 1969, when simulation A shows a weakening economy, the simulated spending on producers' structures (in constant dollars) is about 6 percent below actual, while that on producers' durable equipment is over 2 percent below actual. Similarly, nonfarm inventory investment is simulated almost $5 billion (annual rates in 1958 dollars) too low on average for the same two quarters.
FRAMEWORK AND KEY ASSUMPTIONS
The remainder of this section explores what sort of policy would have been required starting in 1969: 1 to achieve goal-gradualism, that is, the attainment of a desirable path for real GNP. The exercise serves to press home the fact that goal-gradualism may require abrupt or even violent changes in the policy instruments. The analysis will take place within the context of the model and against the background of the world as it appeared at the beginning of 1969.
As will be seen below, the monetary policy required for goal-gradualism from 1969:1 through 1970:2 is at first more restrictive, and then less restrictive, than the policy actually followed in that period. In addition, the monetary policy required from 1970:3 to 1975:4 is substantially more expansionary than anyone seems to contemplate. These results must be interpreted primarily as an exercise, because of the unknown reliability of the model and because of the numerous assumptions that must be made about the exogenous variables.
Explicit assumptions about fiscal policy underlie the simulation. These are basically taken from the 1970 Economic Report.7 The assumed federal expenditures are taken from Table 14 (p. 80), and the federal tax rates assumed involve tax cuts in order to produce a full employment surplus of 1.1 percent of GNP in 1973-75. It must be recognized that the fiscal assumptions are quite restrictive since real federal purchases of goods and services are assumed to decline out to 1975 and the full employment surplus is substantial. The decline in purchases is, in fact, unlikely to occur, and indeed in the Report the Council of Economic Advisers explicitly recognizes that, starting in 1973, resources will be available to permit either increases in federal spending or reductions in taxes. In the simulations, it was assumed that the latter course will be taken. These fiscal policy assumptions, although not completely realistic, provide a useful base from which to explore alternative monetary policies, and it is necessary only to keep the nature of these assumptions in mind in judging the reasonableness of the simulations of alternative monetary policies. 8. Simulations were also run using several assumptions about expenditures increases. Since using these assumptions produces only minor differences in the nature of the monetary policy consistent with the desired output path, these simulations are not discussed below.
In simulating the model to 1975, numerous assumptions about other exogenous variables are required. Every effort has been made within the time constraints to assure that these assumptions are reasonable, with the most effort being spent on the variables that have a relatively large impact on the results.9
It has also been necessary to choose between alternative forms that have been estimated for several equations of the model. And finally, the standard equation for the long-term corporate bond rate has been altered in an ad hoc fashion in order to make the rate react more quickly to changes in short-term interest rates. This change makes the results less deflationary than they otherwise would be over the 1969-75 simulation period.
The assumed desired output path is one very close to the real GNP projected in the 1970 Economic Report, Table 13 The desired path of real GNP in the 1970 Economic Report is not exactly the path that would have been specified in early 1969. By late 1969, when the Report was being written, the output gap was somewhat larger, and the progress in slowing inflation somewhat smaller, than had been hoped early in the year. Nevertheless, these differences are minor for the purposes of this paper, and so no attempt has been made to adjust the projections of the 1970 Economic Report to what they might have been had they been made in early 1969.11 9. Details of the various assumptions used in the simulations are listed in a mimeographed appendix available from the author.
10. 1969 JEC Hearings, Pt. 2. 11. In principle the desired path should itself be the result of an optimization procedure. For example, if a loss function were specified in terms of the output gap and the rate of inflation, it might well be that the total loss would be lower if the output gap were smaller but maintained longer, or larger but maintained not as long, than assumed by the desired path for purposes of this paper. Since less inflation and more output are both desired, the problem should always be approached in terms of finding the optimal trade-The desired path has real GNP moderately below potential until 1973:1, at which time it begins to follow the path of potential GNP as defined in the 1970 Economic Report.'2 The simulation was then used to find the path for the money stock required to achieve the desired path of real GNP, given the assumptions discussed above. (Money stock is defined throughout this paper as demand deposits plus currency and is assumed to be the exogenous monetary policy variable in the model.) The procedure used was purely one of trial and error: The money stock was adjusted from one trial simulation to the next until the desired GNP path was obtained. The end result of this process will be called "simulation B" and the path of the money stock in this simulation will be called "money path B." The results of simulation B are shown in Figure 1 .
The approach underlying simulation B places greater emphasis on output than on the rate of inflation, even though in principle equal attention should be paid to both. One reason for this greater emphasis is that the exposition is easier if it starts from a desired output path and then examines the implication of that path for the rate of inflation. A second reason is that the political realities seem to point primarily to the maintenance of output at levels close to potential and secondarily to the reduction of the rate of inflation. In other words, it seems likely that output goals will be changed only marginally if necessary to obtain a more rapid reduction in inflation, while inflation rates much higher than expected would be tolerated if necessary to maintain output. of only 1.3 percent. Thus it appears that actual monetary policy in that period, while not precisely conforming to money path B, nevertheless has the same general level of restrictiveness. In qualitative terms, the difference was relatively minor. In part, in the first half of 1969, the actual path was probably higher than intended, and therefore higher than money path B, as a result of errors in the preliminary data on the money stock. Except for these errors, policy might well have produced slower monetary growth in the first half of 1969. Also, going from the 7 percent growth rate of 1968 to the zero rate in money path B for 1969:1 might have produced excessive strains in the financial markets.
Money path B may be described as a policy of stringency for four to six quarters followed by ease, although some may quarrel with attaching the label "stringent" to the initial part of this path. But the argument would be that, given a rate of inflation of about 5 percent in 1969, and given an average growth rate of money of 6.7 percent for the two years ending December 1968, the initial part of money path B is indeed very restrictive, even though the money growth rates are not low by historical standards.
The logic of a policy of stringency followed by ease can be readily understood. The sooner some excess capacity develops, the sooner inflation will begin to subside. Once the rate of inflation slows, inflationary expectations begin to be revised downward, which tends to dampen inflation even further. But as this process of slowing inflation and dampening of expectations gets underway, considerable monetary ease is necessary to prevent output from falling far below potential. For while the rate of inflation is declining, the level of prices is still rising substantially. Thus if the economy is to remain on the desired output path, money balances must be provided to compensate for the higher price level. Keeping the money stock constant when the price level is rising at a 5 percent rate has roughly the same depressing influence on output as a money stock that falls at a 5 percent rate when the price level is constant.
The high growth rates in money path B in 1971 and 1972 are required, first, because the growth rate of output must be greater than the growth rate of potential output in order to eliminate the GNP gap, and second, because the price level is still rising significantly, though at a steadily declining rate. Once potential output is approached in 1973, it would seem that monetary growth could slow down, since the desired rate of growth of output is about 4 percent. The fact that the growth rate of money path B actually rises may be a spurious result; the high and rising growth rates in 1974-75 are especially suspect. But the general result of a higher growth rate in 1973-75 than in 1971-72 is not unreasonable, and the forces in the model producing this result are identifiable. First, the assumed fiscal policy is quite restrictive, but this factor should not be overemphasized. In simulations run without assuming the tax cuts of simulation B, the full employment surplus came out more than double that of simulation B in 1973-75, and yet the money growth rates were less than a percentage point higher. As a rough guess, fiscal assumptions involving a zero fuli employment surplus might lower the money growth rates by 1.0 to 1.5 percentage points from money path B.
Probably more important than "fiscal drag" is the interaction of monetary and real forces affecting investment. First, inflation is continuing, although at declining rates, thus absorbing nominal money balances. Second, short-term interest rates, after rising with the rapid growth of output in 1971 and 1972, begin to fall after 1973, thereby absorbing more money balances through the interest elasticity of the demand for money. Third, since the corporate bond rate in the model is an eighteen-quarter distributed lag on the commercial paper rate, the bond rate lags behind shortterm rates and so investment is not stimulated very much in the short run by the monetary ease.
Of crucial importance is the interaction of the slow movement of the corporate bond rate with the declining rate of inflation. A key term in the cost of capital determining expenditures on producers' durables is the corporate bond rate minus the expected rate of inflation. And the expected rate of inflation is a twelve-quarter distributed lag on the actual rate. It is difficult to get the bond rate to move down as fast as the decline in the rate of inflation. With insufficient monetary ease, the cost of capital actually rises, thus reducing investment and depressing aggregate demand.
A few numbers may illuminate the operation of the model. of this issue, value judgments on the desirability of a particular inflationunemployment trade-off have been deliberately avoided in this paper; in addition, there has been no effort to explore systematically the implications for inflation of alternative output paths. However, some notion of the extent of the output loss in the model that is required to achieve a lower rate of inflation may be obtained below.
One final way of looking at simulation B is to compare it with United States historical experience since 1867, the first date for which reasonably complete monetary data are available. Historical periods with relatively high monetary growth are reported in Table 2 .18 The two intervals after the Second World War do not involve high growth rates by historical standards, but have been included in the table simply to offer some recent periods. These historical growth rates may be compared with money path B which, using continuous compounding, has a growth rate of 5. 18. The periods selected are all of substantial duration-at least three years. Much higher growth rates occurred over certain shorter intervals. Also, the periods were defined over full years. In most cases, slightly higher growth rates could have been reported by defining periods as a few months longer or shorter than a full year. All the growth rates in Table 2 The mechanism producing this result in the model is fairly simple. Changes in the wage rate depend primarily on the current unemployment rate and on the lagged inflation rate. In turn, the inflation rate depends primarily on a distributed lag of current and past changes in the wage rate. Thus, an early increase in unemployment reduces the increase in the wage rate, which in turn reduces the inflation rate for subsequent quarters. This timing effect is magnified by the fact that the lower output in 1969-70 in simulation B as compared with C and D occurs at a strategic time when unemployment is especially low, and therefore the model is operating in a relatively steep section of the Phillips curve. For example, in 1970:2, the quarter of the maximum output difference between B and C in this period, the model's unemployment rate for B is 4.0 percent while the rate for C is 3.7 percent, a small but important difference given the steepness of the Phillips curve at these unemployment rates.
A REFORMULATION OF INSTRUMENT-GRADUALISM
Where does this analysis leave the policy of instrument-gradualism? First, it is important to recognize that such a policy is designed to cope with uncertainty. The argument is that there is too much uncertainty about the structure of the economy, including the response lags to policy changes, and about the occurrence of random shocks to permit an active, aggressive stabilization policy. This view clearly has great merit; even policy activists do not claim that policy makers can hope to forecast and then offset every small disturbance. The debate is not over a matter of principle but rather over the degree to which an aggressive stabilization policy can be successfully pursued.
However attractive the instrument-gradualist argument, it simply does not fit the current situation without careful amendment. In early 1969 economists of all persuasions agreed that the 1965-68 inflationary experience produced initial conditions for 1969 that guaranteed continued inflation for some period of time. There was practically no uncertainty over the forecast that inflation would continue to be a serious problem for several years.
In this situation a normative argument arose as to how large an output gap ought to be accepted in exchange for reduction in inflation. But more important for the instrument-gradualist approach was the positive argument over how much inflation would occur, and for how long, and over the amount of reduction in inflation associated with a given output gap. The uncertainty relevant for the instrument-gradualist argument, therefore, was considerably influenced by the unfavorable initial conditions of 1969.
Friedman recognized these unfavorable conditions and therefore modified his prescription of steady monetary growth by urging a two-step reduction in the rate of money growth to a steady long-run rate. The simulations above suggest that this recommendation was faulty in two respects. First, a sharp reduction in the money growth rate followed by a subsequent increase appears to promote better GNP and price level paths over time. Secondly, the simulations suggest that the 4 percent rate, and perhaps even the 6 percent rate, of growth of money is too low over the next few years. These results flow from the unsatisfactory initial conditions and the long adjustment lags in the model.
The conviction that adjustment lags are long, variable, and uncertain is at the heart of the instrument-gradualist position. If much weight is given to the "long" part of this position, then the instrument-gradualist recommendation ought not to involve the same sort of policies that might have been appropriate in a year with favorable initial conditions, such as 1965. Instead, the recommendation might be to start with money path B, smooth it, and then substantially reduce rates of growth compared with it in the 1973-75 period, unless evidence accumulates before 1973 suggesting that its high rates are really necessary. This recommendation recognizes that money path B was determined by experimenting with a deterministic model; the introduction of uncertainty clearly argues for smoothing and avoiding extremes.
The simulation results discussed above do not destroy the case for instrument-gradualism, but rather require that it be stated more generally than it has been in the past. Some minimum allowance ought to be made for important factors known to be operating, such as the initial conditions facing policy makers in early 1969. The general problem, of course, is to decide when something is "known to be operating," but in the specific instance of early 1969 the existence and prospective persistence of inflationary pressures were known.
THE SHIFT OF POLICY IN 1969
In any event, it is clear that actual policy has not been instrumentgradualist. Indeed, it can be argued that, considering monetary and fiscal policy together, the shift in policy in 1968-69 was the most deflationary since 1947.
By the beginning of 1969 the economy had gone a long way toward adjusting in real terms to a higher rate of inflation. Interest rates had risen to reflect the inflation, wage contracts provided for future wage increases high enough to offset much of the expected inflation, and the rate of growth of real output had declined to more or less normal levels from the abovenormal rates of increase previously prevailing. From the second quarter of 1967 through the second quarter of 1968, real GNP grew at a 5.0 percent annual rate, whereas the rate was 3.5 percent from the second to the fourth quarters of 1968. By the beginning of 1969 the adjustment to inflation was far from complete, but it had made considerable progress.
Probably the best measure of the shift in monetary policy is the extent to which the rate of growth in the money stock has declined. The change, rather than the level, of the rate of growth seems to be the appropriate measure, because after a sufficiently long adjustment period, it appears that the monetary growth rate determines primarily the rate of inflation and has relatively little effect on the rate of growth of real output.
The With respect to instruments, I do not know that anybody has argued that we must never use a nongradualist approach. Certainly, the changes in monetary policy that took place from 1968 to 1969, and the reversal in the latter part of 1969 to the spring of 1970, represent large changes in the use of monetary instruments, and similar cases can be found in the past. The same things could be said for fiscal policy. I do not know any law of economics that says large changes in monetary and fiscal policy should not be used, and they have been used in the past. They are entirely consistent with the gradualist approach to goals.
David Fand: I think that William Poole's paper is thoughtful and stimulating; if the value of the Brookings Papers is to make people think in a concrete way about these problems, I think it serves the purpose very well. He forces us to work through the exercise and see how one deals with an inflationary economy and how one might go about trying to achieve the administration's goals.
Poole focuses on a discrepancy between gradualism in tools and gradualism in goals-a discrepancy that can come about for different reasons. It could happen because the wrong instrument was used. For example, stabilizing the federal funds rate may be viewed as a gradualist policy, but it could easily result in putting out a lot of money. Monetary policy would then be viewed as gradualist when it was not. Thus when market interest rates are used as an indicator of policy, the authorities may believe that they are following gradualist policies when in fact they are not. This is not the kind of discrepancy that Poole is talking about. He is talking about a case where the right instrument is being used but a discrepancy still develops between gradualism in tools and in goals. This comes about because the economy is different: What looks like a very tough policy viewed in isolation may, in a very hopped-up economy, be in fact a mild policy. The point is to distinguish this kind of discrepancy between tools and goals from that in the first example.
It seems to me the case for gradualism in the use of instruments is made partly on the grounds of uncertainty. But it may also be made on the grounds that the real world is relatively stable and that a lot of the instability comes from destabilizing policies. 
General Discussion
Warren Smith said that he did not consider the Poole paper a monetarist analysis except in the sense that monetary aggregates were used to measure monetary policies. He was surprised that an even faster growth in the money supply was not required. He reasoned that this was a period in which the initial situation is one of rapidly rising prices, with continuing increases throughout the period; fiscal policy is tight throughout the period. Therefore, the demand for money is determined by the growth in real output plus the increase in prices. What did surprise him is that the rapid increase in the money supply had so little effect on interest rates. The model apparently has such long lags that, even over five years, interest rates do not come down. This has some unhappy results. Both business and residential construction are depressed and the rapid increase in the stock of money seems to benefit only the stock market. He would question whether any monetary variable, working through the stock market, would be powerful enough to drive the economy all by itself.
Otto Eckstein found the distinction between instrument-and goal-gradualism an excellent one, but did not agree with the inflation-unemployment Lawrence Klein said that the message he got from the projection was that the money multiplier was not as large as many monetary economists believe. It takes a big input of money, when that is the only policy variable, to achieve full employment.
